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M
r. Yashiro drew on his experience as a senior executive in the oil and banking
industries in the United States, Japan, and China, to compare economic prospects
and corporate cultures in Japan and China. Mr. Yashiro began by outlining some
of the key reasons behind Japan’s post-bubble economic malaise. With American industry 
in decline in the late 1970s and early 1980s, excessive hubris among Japanese corporate
leadership combined with a strengthened yen following the Plaza accords to help create a
domestic economic bubble. The result has been stagnant growth and loss of competitive
edge for Japan since the bubble burst in the early 1990s. 
Mr. Yashiro went on to explain lessons that Japan should learn from the bubble experience.
Lack of international perspective, English skills, scarcity of foreigners among senior corporate
leadership, the seniority-based promotion system, and risk-averse behavior continue to hinder
Japanese corporations’ global competitiveness and the expansion of Japan’s economy.
Moreover, lack of clear national goals, exemplified by former Prime Minister Abe’s stated
goal of a “beautiful Japan,” is the most significant roadblock to renewed economic and 
political strength.
Reflecting upon his recent experience working to reform Chinese state-owned banks, 
Mr. Yashiro outlined several key challenges on the path of continued growth. Chinese 
financial institutions, which recently had bad asset problems similar to those experienced 
by Japan, have largely taken care of them by transferring them to asset management 
companies. Moving forward, China must maintain its high rates of economic growth to avoid
further nonperforming loan problems. Chinese banks must continue to develop a strong
credit culture and risk management skills, prevent irregularities, and improve profitability
through services other than loans and deposits. 
In contrast to the Japanese corporations, Mr. Yashiro described the eagerness of Chinese
banks to tap into the skill and experience of foreigners. Already benefiting from infusions of
Western capital, by absorbing foreign expertise Chinese financial institutions will soon be
among the leading banks in the world, according to Mr. Yashiro. In Tokyo, on the other hand, 
it is rare to see foreigners among senior banking executives, and without fresh ideas and 
perspectives, Japan will struggle to compete globally.
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for Citicorp. Then Mr. Yashiro
retired again. Then Ripplewood
brought him out of retirement to
head Shinsei Bank, which was
another brilliant move, I think, on
Shinsei’s part.
In both institutions, Citicorp
and Shinsei Bank, he installed and
instilled the management disci-
plines he learned at Exxon. Almost
exactly three years ago, he gave a
talk here on what he was accom-
plishing at Shinsei Bank. In 2006,
Mr. Yashiro was named Best
Banker of the Year by The Asian
Banker publication. I think by then
he was in Hong Kong, working to
help reform and develop Chinese
banks while serving as chairman 
of Shinsei Bank after having com-
pleted his term as its president .
And he is now devoting his
efforts to his fourth career—his
previous three being Exxon,
Citicorp, and Shinsei—improving
the Chinese banking system.
Accordingly, he moved to Beijing
late last year and is studying the
Chinese language assiduously. 
I guess he is a proponent of lifetime
learning.
I could go on and tell you much
more about him, but you did not
come here to hear me talk about
him. Rather, you want to hear what
he has to say, and his talk is titled
in a very general way that allows
him to say anything he wants:
“Japan’s Problems and Emerging
China: A Japanese Banker’s
Perspective.”
MASAMOTO YASHIRO
Senior Advisor, Shinsei Bank, Limited
Thank you very much, Hugh. I would like to start by talking
about Japan’s problems, and then 
I will go on to discuss what I think
of the Chinese banking system 
and its future. This evening, rather
than discussing specific banking
problems, I want to deal with 
much larger and broader subjects,
that is, why Japan, including the
banking industry, has suffered
from stagnant growth for the 
past ten years and has lost the
competitive edge in many areas 
of global activities. And then I will
touch on China.
It should be noted that China’s
current rapid economic expansion
reminds us of Japan’s fast growth
during the 1960s. There are 
certain similarities. Among them,
Japan’s decade of the 1960s was
characterized by about 10 percent
per year GDP growth, heavy and
chemical industries playing the
central role in the growth, and con-
sumption—particularly petroleum
—growing at double digits. And,
furthermore, the natural environ-
ment was severely damaged by
rapid industrial growth.
However, there are important
differences between the two coun-
tries’ experiences. In the case of
China, its growth began from an
even lower level compared to
Japan’s. Furthermore, everything 
in China is much larger in scale and
is happening much faster than we
saw in Japan. For example, foreign
exchange reserves as of the end of
July were $1.4 trillion dollars, and
energy demand is increasing even
more rapidly.
Even after the extremely 
rapid economic growth during the
1960s, Japan maintained a some-
what slower, but healthy, growth
during 1970s and first half of the
1980s. I believe there are a couple
of reasons why Japan was able 
to do so. In the early 1970s, we
experienced the first energy crisis,
which eventually collected some of
the excesses of the 1960s. The
world realized that there are finite
limits to global resources that can
be exploited and developed in a
short period of time.
During the 1960s, the global
consumption of petroleum increased
by about 4 percent per year, which
meant that the global economy
needed to add, every year, a pro-
ductive capacity equivalent to that
of Kuwait: two million barrels per
day. Building such a large capacity
every year was getting to be physi-
cally impossible or at least very
difficult. The energy crisis in the
early 1970s caused the world to
look for ways and means to save
energy and improve energy effi-
ciency.
Japan also launched a serious
effort to protect the environment.
The government mandated the use
of lead-free gasoline for automo-
biles and required power generating
plants to burn only low-sulfur fuel
or natural gas. Furthermore, the
industrial structure also began 
to shift away from the heavy 
and chemical industries, such as
steel shipbuilding and aluminum,
toward automobiles and electronic
consumer goods. As a result of a
somewhat fortuitous but serious
reaction to the impact of an energy
crisis, Japan was able to achieve
measurable improvement in air
quality. Japan’s economy has
achieved the best unit of energy
input per unit of GDP output ratio
in the world. 
HUGH PATRICK 
Director, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business, 
Columbia Business School
I t is my pleasure, as well as myhonor, to introduce our distin-
guished lecturer today, Masamoto
Yashiro. 
I have known Mr. Yashiro for
some years and count him as a
good friend. He is a person and 
a business leader I admire and
respect deeply, and you will see
why once you hear what he has 
to say.
During the course of the year,
the Program on Alternative
Investments of the Center on
Japanese Economy and Business
brings you distinguished lecturers
in finance, holds symposia, and,
under Alicia’s leadership, has 
inaugurated an annual conference
series in late May in Tokyo.
You have a brief of biography of
Mr. Yashiro in the program booklet,
and I will not repeat that, but let me
tell you a few other things about his
career. He was the first Japanese
that I know of to work for a major
American multinational firm in a
major position in the United States,
not in Japan. He ran operations 
for Exxon in Houston, and there,
among other things, he learned 
the central importance of detailed
monthly performance measures, as
he has mentioned to me from time
to time.
John Reed of Citicorp brought
Mr. Yashiro out of retirement from
Exxon to head Citicorp’s Japan
operations and to be a part of a
core team, the senior management,
I believe the root of Japan’s
economic problems began to sur-
face in the early 1980s, when
Japanese business management
was widely regarded as the model
for the rest of the world. The
United States started to suffer
from the effects of inflation and
lost competitiveness in the world
market; in particular, the U.S. auto
industry began to lose its dominant
position to Japanese competitors.
Seeing these unexpected 
but advantageous developments,
Japanese corporate managers
became very impressed with them-
selves and began to say, “We now
have nothing to learn from any-
body, including the United States.”
To make matters worse, the
September 1985 Plaza Accord
caused a sudden and very large
revaluation of Japanese yen per
U.S. dollar: from 240 yen to 150
yen by January 1987.
The Japanese government,
among others, decided to provide
the market with an almost unlimited
supply of low-interest-rate credit in
order to support export industries.
This freely available supply of
cheap money caused not only indi-
viduals but also corporations to do
what was called zaiteku, financial
engineering, which simply meant
putting money into domestic stocks,
as well as real estate properties in
Japan and abroad. The Nikkei 225,
which hovered around 12,000 yen
in 1985, climbed to 39,000 yen by
the end of 1989, and the property
market in most of the major cities
went through the roof.
Since many people know about
the bursting of the bubble and its
aftermath, I will not dwell on the
matter. Rather, I wish to discuss
what and how this experience must
change us so that we do what is
necessary to restore the Japanese
economy’s strength and competi-
tiveness in the next several years,
before it is too late.
First, Japanese corporate
management lacks a truly global
orientation. Only a handful of 
companies have non-Japanese
individuals as members of their
board. Sony and Nissan seem to be
the only large Japanese companies
who have, or have had, non-Japanese
individuals as their chief executive
officers, but even that was a result
of poor earlier management prob-
lems. Government deliberative
councils on education spent an
inordinate amount of time discussing
whether or not Japanese grade
schools should teach English as a
second language and have finally
decided against it. They felt that
teaching a foreign language to
young children could divert the 
children’s attention from learning
proper Japanese, which is very bad
reasoning.
In sharp contrast with such a
decision, in China English is now
taught beginning in the first grade.
As you know, most Japanese in
leadership positions, either in poli-
tics, government, or business, do
not have the ability to communi-
cate directly in English with their
counterparts in other countries.
Communication through inter-
preters, no matter how good the
interpreters are, is not as effective
as direct communication. 
Perhaps one of the most serious
problems is that Japan no longer
has well-defined national goals.
The Abe government’s defeat in 
the recent election of the House 
of Councilors can be attributed,
significantly, to the fact that his
announced government objectives,
such as a “beautiful Japan” and
revision of the constitution, were
either too abstract or did not
address any of the important
issues of public concern.
Now that Mr. Abe is gone, his
successor [Prime Minister Fukuda]
should direct people’s interest to
something concrete that we
Japanese would like to aspire to
achieve. For instance, grow the
Japanese economy by 3 percent
per year for the next five years.
How can we achieve that? Or make
Tokyo University, which probably is
considered the best educational
institution in Japan, one of the top
five in the world, rather than its
current 20th ranking. Or improve
the profitability of Japanese 
companies by getting corporate
managers interested in improving
efficiency of capital use.
The Japanese government
must develop much closer political
and economic relationships with
our own neighbors. With more 
than 50 years of strong U.S. influ-
ence in politics, government,
business, and even our daily life,
Japan has tended to follow, almost
blindly, the lead of the United
States. Now that Asia has become
a very important region of power in
world affairs, we must reinforce our
effort to establish closer contacts
with our neighbors, in particular
China and South Korea. A peaceful
and stable Asia, without conflicts
between Japan and China, would 
be a very desirable condition for
the global economy and prosperity.
In particular, it would be very bene-
ficial for the prosperity of Japan
and China. 
The overseas presence of
Japanese banks is rather insignifi-
cant, as they tend to work only with
Japanese corporate customers
operating overseas, rather than
becoming an integral part of the
local economy. For their overseas
operations, Japanese banks must
change the management structure
to place locally hired, qualified indi-
viduals in key positions. I believe
the sooner Japanese banks let
local people run the local opera-
tions, the faster they can develop
corporate and individual busi-
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One of the legacy problems in
the post-bubble years is that the
current corporate managers at
Japanese banks are in their 50s
and early 60s, so that they have
spent the last 15 years dealing
with the aftermath of the bubble
bursting, mainly fighting bad asset
problems. As a result, they have
become excessively conservative
and generally risk averse. Almost
any business, including the banking
business, has some elements of
risk. Taking acceptable risks is a
precondition for business success.
Lastly, I believe we must 
invite qualified non-Japanese into
Japanese corporate management.
The fact that practically every
Japanese company’s management
consists of only Japanese individuals
causes the management to hold on
to a traditional approach and reject
nonconventional ideas or approaches
as heresies. Since the world is
changing very quickly, and since
many innovative concepts and
approaches are being introduced,
an attitude of isolation will become
a deterrent to Japan’s progress.
Now, turning to China, over the
last several years, Chinese banks
were faced with bad asset prob-
lems similar to those that Japanese
banks experienced from the mid-
1990s. The Japanese banking
industry took nearly ten years to
clean up the balance sheet prob-
lems and restore capital ratio to
acceptable levels. 
The Chinese government
transferred much of the nonper-
forming loans (NPLs) from the
state-owned banks into separate,
newly created asset management
companies, then injected large
amounts of U.S. dollars from the
government foreign exchange fund
to shore up the banks’ impaired
capital base. I believe the govern-
ment injected $60 billion into three
banks. I think the Bank of China
and China Construction Bank each
received $22.5 billion and that $15
billion went to the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China. 
During the past three years or
so, large Chinese banks, particu-
larly some of the state-owned
ones, have begun to pursue the
strategy of developing a strong
credit culture and risk manage-
ment skills. They are working 
hard to prevent the recurrence of
irregularities within their own insti-
tutions. At the same time, in order
to improve their profitability, they
are developing capabilities to offer
fee-generating products and serv-
ices other than deposits and loans. 
Needless to say, the future
success of these large Chinese
banks depends on several critical
factors. Among them is whether
the Chinese economy can maintain
the high growth rates of the past.
When the economy continues to
grow, bad loan problems generally
do not surface because growth
provides businesses with the nec-
essary cash flow. If the economy
stops growing at a high rate, how-
ever, loan assets, which otherwise
would remain normal, could turn
into bad assets. 
Therefore, above all, the
Chinese government must avoid
the bubble and manage a high
enough growth rate, but not so
high a rate that it could cause 
bubbles in the economy. This is 
not easy. However, I believe the
Chinese government and the
People’s Bank of China will be
capable of avoiding the occurrence
of bubble-related banking prob-
lems. Furthermore, a sudden and
very large renminbi revaluation, as
we saw for the Japanese yen in
1985–1986, will not happen. The
Chinese government will let the
renminbi exchange rate adjust its
only gradually, in a measured way.
I am on the advisory board 
of the China Banking Regulatory
Commission. There are seven 
people on that commission, 
and they are all foreigners. The
Japanese Financial Services
Agency (FSA) does not have any
foreigners in such a position,
despite the fact that foreign advi-
sors play a very important role. In
fact, this past June our advisory
board met in Beijing with the pre-
mier of China, Wen Jiaobao, and
spent one hour discussing Chinese
banking problems. 
I believe that practically all of
the Chinese banks must work
harder to create a sound credit 
culture, to evaluate customers’
credit worthiness, and apply proper
pricing to their base loan interest
that is appropriate for each risk
category of borrowers. They tend
to charge most borrowers the
same interest rate, which is a prob-
lem. For a goal as important as
credit management, they must
develop a management process
that enables their internal decision
makers to know exactly, on a real-
time basis, what transactions are
being conducted between the
banks and their customers, and
what the products and services
are. This is not only about what
machines the bank buys. I have
seen that Chinese banks are buy-
ing very expensive hardware from
U.S. companies, which they do not
use as well as they should. There 
is a tendency for large companies
to think they have a good control
system just because they spent
several hundred million dollars on
technology.
As long as most of the trans-
actions at local branches are
recorded manually, there is a high
degree of possibility that errors
and fraud can take place without
being detected on a real-time
basis. Indisputably, the machine
does not lie and follows faithfully
what it is programmed to do by
humans. You know the phrase
“garbage in, garbage out.” Human
I believe the Chinese
government and 
the People’s Bank 
of China will be 
capable of avoiding 
the occurrence of 
bubble-related 
banking problems.
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beings are liable to make errors
and even engage intentionally in
fraud. In other words, I believe a
good internal control system can
be achieved only if a bank has a
well-developed machine-based
management process.
I was an independent director
of China Construction Bank from
September 2004 until June of this
year. I retired, but I am now an advi-
sor to China Construction Bank.
From the limited but invaluable
experience I have gained from the
past couple of years, I would like to
make the following observations.
First, as you know, all of the
state banks are exceedingly large
and they need not be any larger.
They are already too large. China
Construction Bank has a $500 
billion balance sheet, 300,000
employees, and 14,000 branches,
and it makes about $5 billion after
taxes per year. Its NPL ratio was
3.2 percent as of the end of 2006. 
The most critical question is
whether a bank will be able to con-
tain NPL problems in the future,
both in terms of the amount and
the ratio. This is not an easy task.
As we all know, many of the past
NPLs were caused by loans
extended to state-owned enter-
prises. It is very difficult to collect
loans from state-owned enter-
prises, even if they are poor credit
customers. The bank must be firm
in rejecting problematic loans, not
only to private businesses, but also
to the state-owned enterprises,
even when the borrowers have
political backing.
I have watched how they man-
age and collect NPLs. I think that
before the government sorted out
and took bad assets into asset
management companies, all of
these state-owned banks had
about 20 percent to 25 percent in
NPLs. That is significant. But after
taking the bad assets into asset
management companies, most
problem NPL ratios of large, state-
owned banks came down to around
10 percent. It is down to 3 or 4
percent today. The Banking
Regulatory Commission gave
tough targets, the bank hired
young professionals, and manage-
ment listened to independent
directors. 
In fact, in the case of China
Construction Bank, Bank of America,
which became a strategic investor,
has about 50 people working side
by side with the Chinese staff.
They spend a great deal of time
with them, even taking Chinese
trainees into Bank of America’s
operating units in the United
States. I think they are really 
doing their best to improve those
areas I mentioned.
Concerning China Construction
Bank’s board, it now usually meets
quarterly, but during the first 
two years, it met probably every
other month. In three years’ time, 
I attended 35 board meetings.
Each board meeting lasts one full
day. Prior to the board meeting, 
you go to the committee meetings,
which, again, last one full day. So
for two full days per each board
meeting, I had to be in different
cities in China where the meetings
took place. All together, I think I
spent at least 300 to 400 hours
per year as a member of the board
and independent director. This
illustrates the extent to which 
the board members know what is
going on. 
Are the financial statements
published by Chinese banks believ-
able? That is the usual question I
get from my Japanese friends, and
I am sure that my American friends
also have the same question. My
view is that Chinese banks are 
rapidly moving toward international
standards, both in accounting and
in auditing. One of the critical
questions in this area is whether
the current NPL ratio being
reported by large state-owned
banks can be trusted. In my view,
so long as auditing is done by one
of the four internationally recog-
nized accounting/auditing firms,
the financial statements are as
good as you would expect any
place in the world. In fact, before
listing in Hong Kong, China
Construction Bank paid KPMG 
a great deal of money.
The large American companies,
in my experience, spend about
$20–25 million per year on audit-
ing. This is true for Exxon, IBM, and
other such companies. Chinese
banks spend an equal amount.
Auditors identify discrepancies
between what they find and 
what management is reporting.
Generally, the discrepancy is
insignificant, and the effect on the
bottom line is less than 1 percent.
Even if the adjustment is 5 percent
on net income, it is not as signifi-
cant as some people claim. 
One of the questions I raised
about the future of Chinese banks
was where these state-owned
banks are headed. We know that
some foreign strategic investors
have acquired substantial equity
interest, and these banks have had
initial public offerings. And, as you
know, the three state-owned banks
rank among the ten largest banks
in the world, in terms of market
cap. They are Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China, Bank 
of China, and China Construction
Bank. Some people say this is
because their stocks are inflated,
but that is something we can talk
about during the discussion period.
Another question is whether
or not these banks are moving
toward what you call “privatization.”
I raised that question with some of
the Chinese leaders and the middle
management staff as well. They do
not think they are moving toward
privatization, but the answer I get
is interesting. I am sure that you
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know the word “marketization.” I
looked in the 1993 Oxford English
Dictionary and did not find the
word, so apparently it is something
new. I think the Chinese are main-
taining socialism philosophically
and politically, but in terms of eco-
nomic activities, they have gone for
large-scale capitalism even more
than Japan has. Japan is maybe
one of the last remaining socialist
countries, in the sense that every-
body is equal.
My view is that privatization of
the kind that replaces much of gov-
ernment ownership is not likely to
happen in China. The purpose of
inviting foreign strategic investors
was primarily to acquire knowledge
and skills from them to build well-
managed and profitable banks in
the future.
I saw many foreign investors
going to China during 2005 and
2006. In 2007, I do not see as
many. I think the Chinese time
frame is probably five to ten times
faster than Japan’s. Japan has
spent about 20 years wondering
whether or not we should invite for-
eign investors, how to treat them,
what to do with them if they want
to merge, etc. The Chinese probably
learned what needed to be done in
two years. They decided initially
that they needed foreign investors
to demonstrate that China is a
good place for foreigners to invest
in and also to receive some capital
contributions by foreign investors. 
But having seen so many 
foreign investors carrying bags of
money into China, they do not 
need any more money. The Chinese
want to learn the skills and gain
experience. Accordingly, they have
decided to invest in Barclays. I
think they have probably sent one
or two people to be on the board of
Barclays so that they can learn its
strategic view and more.
The Chinese are much more
interested than the Japanese in
learning skills and gaining from 
foreigners’ experiences. The only
reason they invited me to be one 
of the seven members on the advi-
sory committee of the Banking
Regulatory Commission is because
they wanted to learn why the
Japanese banking system went
sour and why we could not solve
the problem for ten years. I think
those are the only reasons. I did not
speak Chinese at all, and I did not
know anything about China, but
they wanted to learn from me
about Japan’s problems.
Having spent three years with
China Construction Bank, and also
the Chinese Banking Regulatory
Commission, I am called the most
optimist Japanese with regard to
the Chinese banking system. I think
in ten years’ time, one or two of the
large Chinese banks will be as good
as Citigroup, Bank of America, or
any European bank. We will see 
one or two Chinese global financial
institutions. That is my bottom line,
because they are very serious in
their desire to learn as fast as 
they can.
Every institution has to have
objectives. “Beautiful Japan” can-
not be an objective. It is somebody’s
perception of how things are in
Japan. You have to have elements
that make people feel Japan is a
good place to do business in or
to go to. That is my bottom line




Let me ask one question tostart. You began by talking
about Japan, and basically you said
in order to compete globally,
Japanese companies have to have
a global outlook, which means they
also have to take on senior staff
who are not Japanese. You seemed
rather pessimistic about the
chance of this happening, and
maybe we will come back to that,
but are Chinese institutions pre-
pared to accept foreigners as
senior members who will then play
an important role? Or do they just
want to hire outside experts and
listen to their advice, and then
after several years, send them
home, similar to the Meiji approach
to the way Japan did it?
MASAMOTO YASHIRO
My answer is very simple. Itdepends on the individual.
Particularly, if the individual speaks
Chinese, they will keep them. If the
individual does not speak Chinese,
it is difficult, because they have to
deal with so many Chinese staff
that may not have other language
facilities. It is desirable to have a
foreigner speaking Chinese. 
In fact, at China Construction
Bank, when I was the chairman of
the Nomination and Compensation
Committee, we were trying to hire
a chief credit officer. I suggested
we hire headhunters and give them
some of the specifications of what
we were looking for. Instead, it was
decided to take out a full-page
advertisement in the Financial
Times. I said, “No. You will receive
many applications, but you will not
find the right person.” 
They did receive many 
applications, but many were from
academics, Chinese academics
studying or teaching in U.S. univer-
sities who had good training
backgrounds but no practical expe-
rience running credit management
in any banking institutions. They
also received applications from 
foreigners, but some of the foreign-
ers asked for very large annual
compensation. 
Finally, they decided to use
their own human resources.
Chinese public institutions have
many qualified individuals coming
back to China rather than staying
I think in ten years’ time,
one or two of the large
Chinese banks will be
as good as Citigroup,
Bank of America, 
or any European bank.
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overseas. I have asked some of those
young people why they come back
to get paid one-third or one-fourth
of what they could earn in the
United States. They said that they
come back because they want to
make their own contribution to the
success of the Chinese institutions.
Actually, I think large Chinese
institutions, even state-owned ones,
are paying very well today. When I
started helping China Construction
Bank as an independent director,
the number one person, the chair-
man of the board, was earning
about 700,000 renminbi a year,
including a performance bonus.
Fifty-five percent is merit, 45 per-
cent is base. That is the nearly
50/50 split, which you do not gen-
erally find in Japan. The problem is
they do not differentiate perform-
ance pay among people as widely
as they should. I tried to raise the
chairman’s pay as fast as I could. 
If you work as top middle man-
agement at a state-owned bank,
you earn about $50,000 per year.
Now the top people at Chinese
banks earn about $100,000 per
year. Again, this pay differential is
too compressed, and it needs
widening, but I think such impor-
tant changes have to be approved
by the state council or a similar
organization. You cannot make a
decision and implement it right away.
Privately owned Chinese banks
can pay three times as much as
state-owned ones for top people.
So the Chinese are paying quite
well. If you ask Chinese people
today which foreign large private
institutions they would like to work
for, their order of preference is
Chinese, American, European, 
and then Japanese. Below that 
are South Korean and Taiwanese
institutions. 
The Japanese companies’
problems are not only pay related,
but foreigners lack ample promo-
tional opportunities. I think this is a
very bad situation. If you want to
run multinational corporations, 
you do not look at nationality, skin
color, or religion. You have to really
look at individuals’ capabilities and
contributions.
As a chairman of the Compen-
sation Committee, I have tried to
develop incentive plans. I was amazed
how often I met with the staff of
human resources and the board
during the first six months. We
came up with three plans. The first
is an employee stock ownership
plan. Employees can buy at a 19
percent discount from the market
price. Depending on their annual
salary, there is a limit to how much
each person can buy. The second is
a performance bonus in terms of
stock equivalents. If your perform-
ance is very good, then the bank
can give a cash equivalent to stock.
The third is the management 
incentive program. This is a stock
appreciation right, which allows a
manager to receive a cash equiva-
lent to the stock appreciation over
a specified period. 
I do not think any Japanese
company I know of has three differ-
ent incentive programs of this kind
or has developed them within six
months. Currently, only one of
these programs has been approved
by the Chinese government, and
two are still pending, though I think
it is only a matter of time before
they are approved. 
It is interesting to note that
one of the independent directors, a
Chinese university finance profes-
sor, argued very strongly against
the introduction of a stock owner-
ship plan. I think he remembered
too well the freezing cold stock
market of 2005 and worried that 
if we encouraged the employees 
to buy stock and the stock went
down, then it would be bad for the
employees. He is still very much a
socialist-oriented thinker in this
way. Really, it is up to the employ-
ees whether they buy stock or not.
I think he wanted to protect the
employees. So far, stock prices
have increased significantly in two
years’ time, and I wish that we had
introduced the plan more quickly
and that the Chinese government
was faster to approve the stock
ownership plan.
AUDIENCE
When you left Tokyo Universityin 1958, you decided to join
the Japan branch of Standard
Vacuum Oil Company, which was
an American company at the time.
What were your thoughts with
respect to joining an American
company instead of a Japanese
one or the government?
MASAMOTO YASHIRO
Well, to tell you the truth, Inever wanted to be a busi-
nessman. I wanted to teach like
Professor Hugh Patrick, but when 
I was a graduate student at Tokyo
University, I was led to believe that
since I did my undergraduate stud-
ies at Kyoto University, not Tokyo
University, I would never be able 
to get a job at a top school like
Tokyo University.
In the meantime, while at a
cocktail party with my wife, I met 
a man who worked for an oil com-
pany. Eventually, after we spoke
several times, he convinced me to
work for Standard Vacuum, which
is the predecessor of Exxon Mobil
Corporation in Japan. I begin at its
head office. I only took the job
because my wife wanted me to.
She said, “We are getting hungry.” 
So I had my first job. I was run-
ning the Exxon Japanese affiliate,
which probably makes about 
$150 million a year net income.
The group as a whole used to make
about $300 million out of equity
interests in Japan. And I had at
least 2,000 people working for me. 
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I have never liked conventional
things, and I thought working for an
American company was going to be
very interesting.
AUDIENCE
Iwould like to hear your assess-ment of the opening of China’s
financial sector, related to its World
Trade Organization obligations. 
MASAMOTO YASHIRO
I think Liu Mingkang, chairman of China Banking Regulatory
Commission, says there are three
different reactions from foreign
banks operating in China. One is
that of very happy people working
as strategic investors with Chinese
counterparts. Then there are some
people who are always complaining
about problems with the Chinese
partner. The third reaction is uncer-
tainty about what to think. 
I think that Bank of America’s
strategy is a very interesting and
correct one. First of all, Chinese
law permits equity ownership by
foreigners up to 25 percent, but
one foreign investor can own only
19.9 percent. In the case of China
Construction Bank, 19.9 percent is
owned by Bank of America, and 5.1
percent by Temasek, a Singapore
investment entity. That makes up
25 percent. 
Bank of America has made it
known that it is not interested in
maintaining its own operation in
China. It is going to do everything
through China Construction Bank.
That is one of the main reasons why
China Construction Bank selected
Bank of America as its partner. 
AUDIENCE
You spoke about internationalexpansion of both Japanese
and Chinese banks. Looking five
years ahead, do you believe that
any of the major Chinese banks will
make an acquisition to control a
first- or second-tier international
bank, both to take advantage of its
international network and to assim-
ilate its management and credit
systems? And, similarly, could you
see a Japanese bank making a
comparable move in that same
time frame?
MASAMOTO YASHIRO
Ithink that Chinese banks will bemore likely to acquire second-tier
non-Chinese banks overseas.
When Chinese banks do acquire
second-tier banks, they will proba-
bly not replace management and
will depend instead on the existing
management to run it. They will
probably send middle management
to work side by side with the local
people and to learn from them. 
This is what I think will happen.
I think the Japanese model is
the exact opposite with respect to
acquiring a foreign bank. They will
run it with Japanese people at the
top, and the local people will not
get the top jobs, even in the local
market. Moreover, I do not think the
Japanese banks have the appetite
to acquire foreign banks today,
because this was done during the
1970s and 1980s, and most of
them failed.
I think the important matter
is who runs the foreign bank that 
is acquired. The Chinese are too
smart to satisfy their egos by 
sending their own people and con-
sequently messing up the whole
situation. I think they would exer-
cise management control in only
two ways: deciding who runs the
local operation and how much money
they will spend. The secret of good
management, I think, is not to
bother with the day-to-day business.
AUDIENCE
Iam interested in your expectationthat there will be one or two of
the big Chinese banks that will join
the ranks of the mega global banks
in ten or so years. I am wondering 
if that expectation assumes that
China will avoid any kind of signifi-
cant economic bump, say from 
12 percent growth to 4 percent. 
I understand there are many poten-
tially latent bad loans in the system
that do not show up when growth is
great. Can the Chinese system and
these one or two big banks survive
a shock?
MASAMOTO YASHIRO
Ido not know how the ChineseGDP could go down to 4 percent
growth. If you go back to Japan’s
experience, remember that Prime
Minister Ikeda announced a national
income doubling plan at the begin-
ning of the 1960s. That meant 7.2
percent growth for ten years, but
actually GDP growth was more
than 10 percent during the 1960s.
I think China is in some trouble if
the economy slows down to 6–7
percent. However, in some ways, 
I think that if China’s economy 
has a brief bump that causes
adjustments, like Japan had with
the energy crisis, it would be very
good, because it would cool all
heads a bit. 
Now, why I am optimistic about
the Chinese banking system with
regard to NPLs is because I give 
a lot of credit to the Banking
Regulatory Commission. It has
done a very good job. In the first
half of 2006, for instance, China
Construction Bank’s loan balance
increased 26 percent relative to
the previous year. During the sec-
ond half of the year it slowed down
significantly and annual growth
was only 15 percent. In this case
the Banking Regulatory Commission
sent a lot of instructions to China
Construction Bank and talked to
senior management, the board, 
and so on. I think the Banking
Regulatory Commission always
takes very timely actions in this
I do not think 
the Japanese banks
have the appetite 
to acquire 
foreign banks today.
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manner. If China Construction
Bank is likely to have any NPL 
problems, I think the government 
of China, through the Banking
Regulatory Commission or even the
State Council, would do something
about it. I did not see this happen in
my own country. When the bubble
started in Japan in the second half
of the 1980s, very little was done
to stop it, and all of a sudden it 
collapsed in the early 1990s.
AUDIENCE
Do you feel there is a crisis or major problems looming
ahead for China?
MASAMOTO YASHIRO
Well, I think that you shouldread Greenspan’s book, 
as he devotes about 15 pages to
China. He is quite concerned about
agriculture, the farming communi-
ties’ income disparity, and so on. I
am aware of some of the problems,
but I tend to be more optimistic
than he is. 
The problem with the banking
system in China is that you do not
know what is happening some-
times because you often have
around 14,000 branches across
the country. This is why there is a
lot of emphasis on IT renovation,
and it started with the China
Banking Regulatory Commission. I
believe that by the end of this year,
90 percent of operations will be
automated at China Construction
Bank. So long as you have people
who prepared and programmed
computerization properly, you
know exactly what is happening 
in real time. 
Generally speaking, most of
the top managers in most countries
show little interest in learning 
what IT can do, but I have taken a
perhaps inordinate amount of inter-
est and spent a large amount of
time talking to IT guys from India.
We had an Indian fellow who was
very well known in the IT field. 
I learned enough to ask good 
questions, but, more importantly,
he expected me to tell him what 
I wanted as the CEO of the bank. 
I told him that I wanted to know, 
on a monthly basis, exactly what
products or services generated
what revenue, and what cost was
incurred by that business, by cus-
tomer, and by product group. This
request was delivered quickly.
HUGH PATRICK
How did you, as an outsider inChina, deal with the reality
that there was tremendous political
pressure from the highest levels to
lend to certain individuals or insti-
tutions that were not necessarily
the most economically efficient?
MASAMOTO YASHIRO
Iwill give the credit to the chair-man of the Banking Regulatory
Commission. Within my first year
as independent director, I and the
other independent directors were
invited to meet with him. He men-
tioned specific state enterprises by
name that were probably very risky.
He told us we should not let the
bank make loans to them. 
I do not think there is any pres-
sure today from State Council to
keep making loans to badly run
state enterprises. I think if you ask
the chairmen of the large Chinese
banks, they would agree.
There is some corruption. The
first chairman I met after September
2004 was a very nice person. I
think within six months he found
himself in jail. One of his predeces-
sors was also jailed. The chairman 
I first met had allegedly received 
a bribe, and I think he is serving a
ten-year sentence. Can you imag-
ine receiving a bribe from a Hong
Kong–based IT company in the
amount of US$600,000.00,
according to the Chinese newspa-
per, and being jailed for ten years?
His predecessor is also serving 15
years in jail. The government is very
serious about punishing those peo-
ple who violate the law. The other
problem, however, is again in the
area of compliance, and, shall we
say, breaking the law. Oftentimes,
it is impossible to know what is
going on at countryside branches.
The branches used to have author-
ity to make loans. Today, any loan
of a particular size and above has
to come to the head office. 
I think many people who like 
to think that China is going to have
a problem take the “glass is half
empty” perspective. I like to think
that the glass is half full, because 
it takes time to correct all the prob-
lems, and China is moving fast to
do this. I think the future looks
quite good.
AUDIENCE
Do you think there is hope thatJapanese banks will make 
the changes necessary to become
competitive again in the interna-
tional business field, or should they
get out of international business
and focus on domestic business?
MASAMOTO YASHIRO
I think the management structuremust be changed to allow
younger people to move into senior
positions faster, rather than only
promoting by seniority. If you
replace the current management
with people who have Japanese
banking experience and are 
completely bilingual because they
studied abroad, and then also 
hire foreign individuals who have
special skills, then there is hope. 
The Japanese have not yet
developed highly value added prod-
ucts and services where they can
use non-Japanese experience by
hiring people from outside. If you
The problem with 
the banking system 
in China is that 
you do not know 
what is happening
sometimes because
you often have around
14,000 branches
across the country.
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go to the Marunouchi district of
Tokyo, 99.9 percent of the people
have black hair, no hair, or white
hair. There is no blonde or red hair,
and that is a very bad thing. I think
if you hire non-Japanese, that
means you are bringing somebody
else’s experience into your own
organization. That is why I think
that if the management of
Japanese corporations decides,
“We really have to learn from some-
body else,” that could cause some
important changes. Unfortunately,
Japanese management is very pro-
tective of its jobs, and foreign and
young people are a threat to them. 
Sometimes people think I am
crazy when I say this, but if you fire
everybody over 55 years old from
the management and replace them
with people 45 years or younger,
you will have a great institution. I
really think that we have to change.
Somebody said to me the other
day, “It is not the age; it is the men-
tality.” Some older people can be
young in spirit, but I am not entirely
convinced. I think Japanese should
have more curiosity about what the
rest of the world is doing.
CLOSING REMARKS
HUGH PATRICK
You are very young in spirit, and I think that has been
demonstrated tonight. Just about
three years ago, you were talking
here at Columbia Business School
about your work at Shinsei Bank,
and you spoke of how you were try-
ing to use that experience as a
model for how Japanese banks
should change and become, them-
selves, more profit oriented, more
efficiency oriented, more global,
more utilizing of foreign expertise. 
I think that that was not a happy
message for many traditional
Japanese bankers. 
I suppose that was frustrating
for you, but now you have found a
wonderful, huge country that really
needs your services, and I think the
Chinese are very fortunate to have
you as committed as you are to
helping solve the massive issues 
of how to handle finance within a
rapidly developing economy.
We are indebted to you. Thank
you so very much.
Japanese management 
is very protective 
of its jobs, and 
foreign and young 
people are 
a threat to them.
September 20, 2007 11
COEDITORS
Jeff Lagomarsino
Senior Research and Publications Officer



















New York, NY 10027
Phone: 212-854-3976
Fax: 212-678-6958
E-mail: cjeb@columbia.edu
http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/cjeb
